Experience is one of the most commonly studied variables in clinical judgment research. In a metaanalysis of research from 1970 to 1996 of judgments made by 4,607 participants from 74 studies, Spengler, White, AEgisdóttir, Maugherman, Anderson, et al. (2009) found an experience-accuracy fixed effect of d ϭ .121 (95% CI [.06, .18]), indicating that with more experience, counseling and other psychologists obtain only modest gains in decision-making accuracy. We sought to conduct a more rigorous assessment of the experience-accuracy effect by synthesizing 40 years of research from 1970 to 2010, assessing the same and additional moderators, including subgroup analyses of extremes of experience, and conducting a sensitivity analysis. The judgments formed by 11,584 clinicians from 113 studies resulted in a random effects d of .146 (95% CI [.08, .21]), reflecting the robustness of only a small impact of experience on decision-making accuracy. The sensitivity analysis revealed that the effect is consistent across analysis and methodological considerations. Mixed effects metaregression revealed no statistically significant relation between 40 years of time and the experience-accuracy effect. A cumulative meta-analysis indicated that the experience-accuracy effect stabilized in the literature in the year 1999, after the accumulation of 82 studies, with no appreciable change since. We assessed a broader range of experience comparing no experience to some experience and comparing nonexperts with experts, and for differences as a function of decision making based on psychological tests; however, these and most other moderators were not significant. Implications are discussed for clinical decision-making research, training, and practice.
from the point of "no" experience to "some" experience. On the other end of the experience continuum, in accordance with Ericsson's theory of expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) , we sought to more explicitly assess gains made by experts versus nonexperts in decision-making accuracy. Finally, we include methods for meta-analyses that Greenhouse and Iyengar (2009) subsume under the construct of sensitivity analysis. The assumption here is the more that is known about the data, the more successfully the data can be used to develop, test, and refine scientific inquiry.
Before further explaining these changes in our synthesis of the experience-accuracy effect, it is relevant to briefly describe pertinent findings from clinical judgment research. Although it is assumed that counseling psychologists are capable of making accurate judgments, research has shown this is not always the case. The potential shortcomings and pitfalls of clinical judgment, including use of judgmental heuristics associated with stereotyping, prejudice, and other biases, have been well documented (Faust & Ahern, 2012; Gambrill, 2005; Garb, 1998; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Spengler, 2013) . Counseling psychologists, for example, have been found to engage in biased hypothesis-testing strategies (Morran, 1986; Pfeiffer, Whelan, & Martin, 2000; Strohmer, Shivy, & Chiodo, 1990) ; to invoke stereotypes about gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual identity (Casas, Brady, & Ponterotto, 1983; Mohr, Weiner, Chopp, & Wong, 2009; Ridley, Li, & Hill, 1998; Wampold, Casas, & Atkinson, 1981; Wisch & Mahalik, 1999) ; and to minimize clients' vocational problems when the client expresses more interesting personal problems (Spengler, 2000; Spengler, Blustein, & Strohmer, 1990) . Of considerable concern is that participants in similar studies, when debriefed, are unaware that they have engaged in biased decision making (di Nardo, 1975) . Lack of awareness or lack of feedback to improve learning is thought to be one reason that counseling and other psychologists' judgments may not improve much with experience (Ericsson et al., 1993) . William James, a pioneering American psychologist, commented on this issue, as he is attributed with saying, "There are a great many people who think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices" (Platt, 1989, p. 240) .
Counseling and other psychologists are frequently called upon to render informed judgments about their clients. Many of these decisions carry high stakes, for example, socially sensitive professional input about adoption, custody, suicide risk, future dangerousness, or recidivism. Ensuring accurate and unbiased clinical judgments is a matter of ethical responsibility (American Educational Research Association, 2014), especially in light of such clear demonstration of bias and stereotyping in clinical judgment research (Garb, 1998) . The general consensus by researchers, however, is that judgment skills may not improve much with more training or experience, be it through education or clinical experience. In fact, scholars have speculated that clinical judgment accuracy may worsen related to repeated and unchecked use of cognitive shortcuts and errors (Dawes, 1994; Faust & Faust, 2012; Garb, 1998; Lichtenberg, 1997 Lichtenberg, , 2009 Ruscio, 2006; Wiggins, 1973) . Over 40 years ago, Wiggins (1973) concluded there is "little empirical evidence that justifies the granting of 'expert' status to the clinician on the basis of training, experience, or information processing ability" (p. 131). More contemporary authors have repeated this position. concluded, "A . . . humbling possibility exists: Training and experience may only improve things modestly for the professional" (p. 33). Faust and Faust (2012) posited, "experts who claim or imply a strong association between experience and accuracy are contradicting the research findings and suggesting they stand beyond reach of the research" (p. 131). Alternative perspectives exist; for example, evidence-based practice was recently redefined as "the integration of the best available research with clinical expertise in the context of patient characteristics, culture and preferences" (italics added; APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006, p. 273) .
The research reviewed to this point relates to clinical judgment outcome studies in which decisions can be categorized as "accurate" or "inaccurate," such as when forming a diagnosis or predicting human behavior. In one measure of judgment accuracy, Wedding (1983) asked experienced neuropsychologists to form judgments with increasing specificity regarding the presence or absence of brain impairment, and the correct judgment was known from brain autopsies. By contrast, other clinical judgment research has investigated decision-making processes and seems to provide some support for the claim that experienced clinicians differ from novices on possibly important cognitive dimensions. These include the complexity of knowledge structures, short-and longterm memory, efficiency in client conceptualization, number of concepts generated, flexibility in therapeutic response, and the quality of cognitive schemata regarding case material (Cummings, Hallberg, Martin, Slemon, & Hiebert, 1990; Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005; Kim & Ahn, 2002; Kivlighan & Quigley, 1991; Martin, Slemon, Hiebert, Hallberg, & Cummings, 1989; Mayfield, Kardash, & Kivlighan, 1999; Mumma & Mooney, 2007; O'Byrne & Goodyear, 1997; Tracey, Hays, Malone, & Herman, 1988) . Experienced clinicians have been shown to be able to employ statistical heuristics more effectively when statistical heuristics are deemed as being important by the clinician (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983) . Although it may be reassuring that novice and experienced clinicians differ on these cognitive dimensions, researchers have also warned against reaching positive conclusions. Martin et al. (1989) , for example, examined how novice and experienced clinicians differed on the extensiveness of their therapeutic conceptualizations, and found that more experienced clinicians' greater automaticity in case conceptualization sometimes resulted in greater error in clinical judgment, consistent with experience-based adjustment models (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003) . provided the only meta-analysis of the relation between experience and judgment accuracy. The "good news" from an empirical perspective is that their FE d of .12 is a real effect. This is because the variance for the overall effect is homogeneous and the 95% confidence interval (CI) surpassed zero. The "bad news" is that this is a small effect by any convention reflecting what can be best called trivial gains with more experience (Lichtenberg, 2009 ). The results of Spengler et al.'s meta-analysis compel counseling psychologists to critically reflect on the effectiveness of their clinical decision making, in training and practice, and led us to reevaluate, extend, and update their findings. One of the most disconcerting findings was that there were few moderators of the experience-accuracy effect that could be used to guide future research, practice, and training. This finding may be an artifact of low statistical power to detect This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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differences between studies, a threat addressed by the current study, in which we have more than doubled the participant pool from 4,607 to 11,584 participants. used a FE meta-analysis model related to the assumption their study search strategy identified almost every available study. They argued, accordingly, that their interest was in making inferences about that collection of studies. In a FE analysis, the assumption is there is one true effect and that all differences in the observed studies are because of sampling error. Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009) note that a more descriptive term, therefore, would be a common-effect model. Use of the FE model is recommended as appropriate when the effect size estimates are homogenous. After removal of only one outlier study (d ϭ 3.08; Garcia, 1993), Spengler et al. found the remaining study effect sizes to be homogeneous, further supporting the likelihood that their results closely align with the hypothesized population effect. Although FE meta-analyses are most commonly used in meta-analyses, a recent reanalysis of FE metaanalyses published in Psychological Bulletin suggests that FE analyses may underestimate 95% CIs at the level of 56% (Schmidt, Oh, & Hayes, 2009 ). The authors recommended reanalyzing FE meta-analyses using a random-effects model because precision has "often been substantially overstated with important consequences for research and practice" (p. 97). This is the type of consideration that is addressed in a sensitivity analysis approach such as we apply in the present study. A sensitivity analysis considers the extent to which the findings might be different as a function of changes in approaches taken to conduct the meta-analysis (Greenhause & Iyengar, 2009) . A sensitivity analysis essentially asks the question of whether the findings are robust to the decisions made in obtaining them (Higgins & Green, 2011) . If the results do not change, then greater confidence can be placed in the conclusions. We utilize a sensitivity analysis approach by evaluating the impact of alternative analyses (FE vs. random effects), the quality of the data set (impact of zero effects, outliers included or excluded), and commonly considered threats to validity in meta-analyses (publication bias, file drawer analysis, funnel plot). These steps further our assessment of the robustness of the experience-accuracy effect from extant clinical judgment research.
Of course, obtaining homogeneous variance may be a prime reason why found few statistically significant moderators. With homogeneous variance, there is oftentimes thought to be no need to assess moderators as the overall effect accounts best for the data. It could also be that the true experienceaccuracy effect is as small as d ϭ .12 and there are few moderators, but this seems unlikely to us. Our hope is that with inclusion of more recent studies and using a random-effects meta-analysis model, this will increase heterogeneity and allow for more sensitive moderator analyses. We tested moderators identified by Spengler et al. with the addition of comparisons of (a) true novices (e.g., untrained undergraduates) with experienced clinicians (graduate students or professionals), (b) nonexpert with expert clinicians, and (c) decision making using or not using psychological tests. The moderators we analyze, therefore, replicate and extend Spengler et al.'s moderators and fall into two clusters: (a) conceptual/theoretical, and (b) methodological. The conceptual moderators are theory-driven, based on behavior decision-making theory (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) , and rationally selected based on our observations of clinical judgment research. The methodological variables (e.g., study quality, experimental design) are standard moderators assessed in meta-analyses. The rationale for selecting the additional moderators warrants further discussion. Past research has suggested that the greatest gain in judgment accuracy may occur in the range of no experience to some experience (L. Lambert & Wertheimer, 1988; M. J. Lambert & Ogles, 2004; Skovholt, Rønnestad, & Jennings, 1997) . L. Lambert and Wertheimer (1988) compared persons with no clinical experience with those who had considerable experience and obtained one of the largest effects (d ϭ 1.71) reported by . By contrast, a classic study by Goldberg (1959) , frequently cited as evidence that decision making does not improve with training, compared secretaries with psychologists and found no difference in their ability to accurately diagnose brain damage on the Bender Gestalt. It is actually very difficult to establish a "no" experience condition, as many undergraduates, such as in Lambert and Wertheimer, may have had some psychology experience. Likewise, the secretaries in the Goldberg study presumably worked in the same VA hospital as the psychologists and were provided, by Goldberg, exposure to the Bender Gestalt. Nonetheless, the assumption here is that in a steep learning curve, the greatest gain in clinical judgment mastery may occur early on in training. In the present study, therefore, we conducted subgroup comparisons between participants as close to "no" experience as possible with the performance of graduate students and professionals.
On the other end of the continuum, we conducted a more refined analysis of what might be considered extreme experience or expertise. Ericsson et al. (1993) inferred from years of research that to become an expert requires a minimum of 10 years of deliberate practice. Although we were unable to find studies in which the issue of deliberate practice with feedback was assessed, we were able to identify comparisons in which groups of participants were identified as "experts," most often by nomination or reputation and less frequently by performance. noted the experience-accuracy effect has been confounded by cross-sectional comparisons with limited ranges of experience. In response to this observation, we sought to test for improvement in decision-making accuracy evidenced by researcher-identified experts compared with nonexperts, and by examining changes from "no" to "some" experience.
We also sought to assess the impact of participants being provided psychological test protocols as the stimuli for their clinical decision making. We assumed that because most tests are empirically derived, and require some training to master, that trained and more experienced clinicians would show greater gains in judgment-accuracy processing test protocols. Lastly, we were interested in the impact of time on clinical judgment accuracy. Training models have changed and evolved. For example, there is now an increased emphasis on social justice and multicultural sensitivity (Altmaier & Hansen, 2012; Fouad, Carter, & Subich, 2012a , 2012b . It may be that changes in training and practice environments have had a positive impact on clinical judgment, which is most frequently researched in relation to bias, prejudice, and cognitive errors (Garb, 1998) . There has also been greater attention to empirically validated assessment procedures (Graham & Naglieri, 2013) . With changes in training and emphasis on empirically validated procedures, judgment accuracy may have improved in more recent years. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In the field of clinical judgment, this meta-analysis serves as one of only a few meta-analyses (AEgisdóttir et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; White et al., 1995) . Our hope by extending is to improve decision-making theory, research, and training in the context of mental health clinical judgments, otherwise shown to be prone to error and bias that is outside the awareness of counseling and other psychologists. We agree with Ridley and Shaw-Ridley's (2009) reaction: "The suggestion of a marginal payoff for the training of counseling and other psychologists should jar even the most ardent supporters of current models of graduate training in applied psychology" (p. 402). Consistent with Gambrill's (2005) position, we argue that clinical judgment occurs at all levels of services engaged in by counseling psychologists (cf. Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon, & Shivy, 1995) , and therefore we should seek, through scientific study, to improve this important component of counseling psychology training, research, and practice.
Method
We combined published and unpublished studies from our search of 1997 to 2010 with the 75 studies from 1970 to 1996 synthesized by 
Coders and Training
The coders for this study were the authors, a third-year graduate student in school psychology, and a second-year graduate student in clinical mental health counseling. All search and coding procedures were standardized using training materials and modified code sheets from the MACJ project. For the search process, the second author, a research assistant, and, ultimately, the first author reviewed each study. Discrepancies about inclusion or exclusion were resolved between the authors. We utilized the same training process as the MACJ project to train coders. Practice coding occurred on easier, and then gradually more challenging, studies until 90% agreement on all of the codes was achieved.
Study Search and Inclusion
The MACJ project used an extreme effort over a 10-year time period to obtain all existing clinical judgment studies from 1970 to 1996 through a large team approach, whereas we pursued a more focused search for only clinical judgment experience-accuracy effects published or in dissertations from 1997 to 2010. We used the same standardized inclusion criteria and searched the same electronic databases as in , namely, PsycINFO, ERIC, Dissertation Abstracts, MEDLINE, and Social Science Index. Bibliographic Retrieval Services was excluded because it had dissolved. The 207 search terms used in the MACJ project were applied to screen dissertations and published studies from 1997 to 2010. After broadly identifying potentially relevant studies, forward-search (citations) and backward-search strategies (references) were used. Spengler et al.'s study reviewed over 35,000 studies, and from that large pool probably identified every experience-judgment accuracy study. Consequently, forward referencing was also carried out with their 75 identified studies.
We initially identified 7,789 studies, of which 862 addressed some type of mental health judgment (e.g., diagnostic decision making, violence risk assessment, prediction of treatment failure) or psychological judgment (e.g., vocational, personality assessment). Studies were excluded when all of the participants were undergraduates, medical professionals, or non-mental-health professionals (e.g., chemists, school principals, police detectives). To be accepted, a study had to be a clinical judgment study and include judges who were professionals or graduate students in various mental health fields such as psychology, psychiatry, social work, psychiatric nursing, and counseling (mental health, school, rehabilitation, and pastoral). Studies including undergraduate students and/or professionals in other fields were included as long as these groups were compared with mental health clinicians. This allowed us to assess the difference between no or very little experience and some or more experience. These criteria resulted in 302 clinical judgment studies, of which 85 assessed clinical or educational experience.
From these 85 studies, 50 were confirmed as establishing a standard for judgment accuracy. The other studies assessed cognitive processes of the clinician (e.g., hypothesis generation, order of information considered; e.g., Falvey, Bray, & Hebert, 2005) where an accurate judgment could not be established. Selected studies focused on clinical judgments about diagnosis or problem type, type of treatment, problem severity, prognosis, problem recall, and accuracy hit rates (usually repeated diagnostic or prognostic judgments). If a study did not report sufficient data to calculate an effect size, the authors were contacted. Ultimately, 37 studies included clear methodology studying the experienceaccuracy effect and sufficient statistics to calculate effect sizes.
We next researched the MACJ database to include studies with nonmental health persons compared with mental health degreed professionals or graduate students to further assess a "no" experience to "some" experience range. From the MACJ database, 220 studies were identified in which comparisons between nonmental health professionals and laypersons with mental health professionals or graduate students had been coded. Of these, 17 directly assessed this question of interest and only two provided sufficient information to code differences between "no" experience to "some" experience groups (Andersen & Hawthorn, 1989; Slavney & Chase, 1985) . The most common reason for exclusion was the absence of what we considered to be a "no" experience group. We maintained a definition of "no" experience that excluded, for example, medical doctors, as they would have had one psychiatry rotation, or undergraduates who had taken more than one psychology course. The second most common reason to not include these studies was an inability to determine the direction of accurate judgment. We next revisited the 75 studies in and identified 13 more studies in which a subgroup com-1 Training manuals and methods materials are available upon request. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
parison could be made between a "no" experience group and mental health graduate students or professionals, and 15 studies in which a subgroup comparison could be made between nonexperts and research-identified "experts." This combined search process added 39 studies to the 75 studies reanalyzed from Spengler et al., for a grand total of 114 studies examining the judgments of 11,609 participants. When publications were based on dissertations we reviewed the dissertation.
Coding Procedures
Studies were dual coded by the second author and a thirdyear graduate student in school psychology using standardized instructions and code sheets for study characteristics, moderator variables, and statistics for effect sizes. Further updated coding occurred between the first author and the second-year counseling graduate student. Discrepancies were resolved between the authors. moderators were coded consistent with their definitions: (a) experience type (clinical, education, both), (b) specificity of experience (general, specific, both), (c) judgment outcome (problem type, hit rate, treatment, severity, prognosis, problem recall, other, combined), (d) criterion validity for accuracy (low, high, both), (e) provision of accuracy feedback (yes, no), (f) study quality (acceptable, good, excellent), (g) publication source (American Psychological Association [APA] journal, other psychology journal, psychiatry or medical journal, dissertation), (h) method of study (analogue, archival, in vivo), (i) ecology of stimulus presentation (directly experienced, indirectly experienced, both), (j) relation of experience to the research design (not in design, primary design, supplementary analyses, multiple), (k) experience as a major variable (yes, no), and (l) publication year. We also coded moderators for (m) inclusion of nonmental-health participants (yes, no), (n) experts versus nonexperts (yes, no), and (o) psychological tests used as stimuli for judgments (no, projective, objective, neuropsychological, combined) . The codes for each study are provided in Table 1 . Statistics were coded for the relation between experience and judgment accuracy by means and standard deviations, correlation coefficients, hit rate percentages, odds ratios, F and t, or chi-square distributions. Cohen's kappa for the moderators and other study characteristics, including metrics for calculating effect sizes, ranged from .71 to .96, indicating substantial to near-perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977) .
Independent Measure: Experience
MACJ coding definitions were used to assess our primary construct of interest. Experience encompassed clinical, educational, or both. Clinical experience referred to time of counseling experience, number of clients seen, number of tests administered, time in a job setting, or other dimensions of time in practice. For example, B. S. Walker (1999) used a measure of number of years providing counseling as a measure of clinical experience. Educational experience referred to number of graduate courses taken, year in graduate training (e.g., first, second, third), level of training (master's, doctoral, internship, postdoctoral), amount of face-to-face clinical supervision, training intervention to improve assessment skills, or other dimensions of time in training. The most common measure of educational experience compared groups by "level of training," such as Hillerbrand and Claiborn's (1990) contrast of 15 graduate students with 17 licensed employed psychologists. We created a combined measure of experience for studies that provided more than one measure of experience. In addition, experience could be general, specific, or both. General experience was experience measured in length of time or exposure to number of clients, for example. Specific experience measured activity exclusive to the judgment task. For example, B. S. Walker operationalized counseling psychologists' experience as number of years in the field (general experience), as well as exposure to clients with a diagnosis of AIDS (specific experience) in a study of bias toward persons with AIDS.
Dependent Measure: Judgment Accuracy
Judgment accuracy is an important construct in the clinical judgment literature (AEgisdóttir et al., 2006; Faust & Faust, 2012; Spengler, 2013) . In the present study, accuracy referred to the validity of clinicians' judgments related to diagnoses or accurate identification of a problem; hit rates, usually of repeated diagnostic or prognostic judgments; treatment decisions; severity assessments; and prognostic predictions. Some form of objectively established measure had to exist for an accuracy calculation. Studies varied in the quality of measures used to establish judgment accuracy. For example, in Garb and Boyle (2003) , 25 diplomate neuropsychologists were provided two sets of test protocols and asked to make diagnostic judgments. Because the test scores reflected average performances of 38-year-olds and average performances of 74-year-olds, the accurate judgment was no impairment; diagnoses of neurological impairment could confidently be said to reflect errors. After extensive content and construct validation of a pool of vignettes, B. S. Walker (1999) selected one vignette that was clearly major depression, and most differentiated from adjustment disorder with depressed mood, to test the assumption that an individual with AIDS with major depression would be misconstrued as having an adjustment disorder. Although these methods provided objective measures of judgment accuracy, other studies employed methods in which the standards for accuracy were more difficult to determine because of the use of logic, professional consensus, practice standards, or other less objective methods. Judgment accuracy, however operationalized, was evaluated as a form of criterion validity (high or low) based on our assessment of the rigor in establishing accuracy. High criterion validity was noted when the researchers included clear standards for accuracy that were highly valid or objective (e.g., Garb, 2003) . Less objective methods of judging accuracy-for example, utilizing a panel of "expert" judges (e.g., Brammer, 2002), or logically constructing vignettes of disorders without any other form of validation (e.g., Yeo et al., 2001)-reflected low criterion validity because consensus or logic, rather than an objective criterion, was used. This issue of criterion validity (high or low) was also treated as a moderator.
Definitions of New Moderators
We extended moderators by seeking to assess moderation by (a, b) extremes of experience (no to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Note. Positive effects indicate higher accuracy associated with increased experience. Between-subjects designs are used in all studies. Overall d is the average of ds for studies as units of judgment accuracy corrected for sample size. CI ϭ confidence interval. Categorical variables and codes: Experience type (1 ϭ clinical, 2 ϭ educational, 3 ϭ both), specificity of experience (1 ϭ general, 2 ϭ specific, 3 ϭ both), judgment outcome (1 ϭ problem type, 2 ϭ hit rate, 3 ϭ treatment, 4 ϭ severity, 5 ϭ prognosis, 6 ϭ problem recall, 7 ϭ other, 8 ϭ combined), accuracy criterion validity (1 ϭ low, 2 ϭ high, 3 ϭ both), tests used by judges (1 ϭ no, 2 ϭ projective, 3 ϭ objective, 4 ϭ neuropsychological, 5 ϭ combined), provision of accuracy feedback (1 ϭ yes, 2 ϭ no), inclusion of no experience participants (1 ϭ yes, 2 ϭ no), experts versus nonexperts (1 ϭ no, 2 ϭ yes), study quality (1 ϭ acceptable, 2 ϭ good, 3 ϭ excellent), publication source (1 ϭ APA journal, 2 ϭ other psychology journal 3 ϭ psychiatry or medicine journal, 4 ϭ dissertation), method of study (1 ϭ analogue, 2 ϭ archival, 3 ϭ in vivo), ecology of stimulus presentation (1 ϭ directly experience, 2 ϭ indirectly experienced, 3 ϭ both), relation of experience to the research design (1 ϭ not in design, 2 ϭ primary design, 3 ϭ supplementary analysis, 4 ϭ multiple), and experience as a major variable (1 ϭ yes, 2 ϭ no). a Corrected for sample size. b When effect size estimates were provided for multiple categories of a nominal variable and the same sample was used (e.g., clinical and educational experience), effect sizes were combined and reported as both or combined categories.
c This study was treated as an outlier and not included in the last two rows in the table.
d Zero effect is inferred. Statistically non-significant results were reported. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
some, nonexpert vs. expert), (c) decision making based on psychological tests, and (d) time as a proxy for changes in training and practice environments. We sought to identify contrasts between individuals with "no" experience with mental health graduate students or professionals. L. Lambert and Wertheimer (1988) contrasted undergraduate students who had taken no more than an introductory psychology course with graduate students in psychology. Other researchers sought to contrast teachers (e.g., Arkell, 1976) or laypersons (e.g., Akehurst, Bull, Vrij, & Köhnken, 2004 ) and other groups we coded as "no" experience with mental health professionals or graduate students. We attempted initially to code subcategories for expert judges (proven general skill, proven specific skill, best performance, nomination by others, scholarly reputation, clinical reputation), but because of empty or small cell sizes collapsed these into expert versus nonexpert comparisons. Experts were commonly peer nominated. Hillerbrand and Claiborn (1990), for example, studied the decision making of 17 experts who were peer nominated, had an APA-accredited degree, were licensed and practiced postdegree over 5 years. In some instances expertness was researcher identified (e.g., Kim & Ahn, 2002) . We coded the use of psychological tests when participants formed their judgments in whole or in part based on objective (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; Walters, White, & Greene, 1988) , projective (e.g., Kinetic Family Drawing; Levenberg, 1975) , or neuropsychological test protocols (e.g., Wechsler Memory Scale; Garb, 2003) . If a battery of test protocols crossing these categories was used, we coded this as "combined." The continuous moderator of "time" was measured by year for a study citation.
Results

Calculation of Effect Size
Incorporating data from , a total of 281 separate effect sizes were entered into the statistical software Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, Version 2 (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005) . Because of differences in statistical analyses, the effect size d was calculated based on reported means and standard deviations, correlations, or other available statistics (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . In studies providing multiple effects, the results were pooled by weighting effect sizes to ensure each study contributed only one effect size, resulting in 114 effects. An average of the effect estimates from each individual study was calculated by weighting each by its inverse variance. Positive effect sizes indicate studies in which judgment accuracy was shown to improve with experience.
The overall effect based on a random effects model from 114 studies and 11,609 participants was d ϭ .157, with a 95% CI above zero ([.088, .226] ). Because the CI does not include zero, this is a statistically significant effect. The size of the overall effect reflects that experience is marginally, but reliably, associated with judgment accuracy. Table 1 provides a summary of the average weighted effect size estimates for the individual studies. Table 2 shows the effect size distribution using a stem-and-leaf plot, which is recommended for an intuitive visual presentation when there are a large number of effects (Borman & Grigg, 2009 ). The distribution has one peak and is positively skewed (tail extending into positive values), with a majority (67.5%) of studies producing positive effects. The heterogeneity within these studies was sig- 
Outlier Analyses
There are no clear guidelines for when, or even if, to remove outliers from a meta-analysis. In fact, only 3% of meta-analyses conduct outlier analyses (Aguinis, Pierce, Bosco, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011) . We assessed statistical outliers to better describe the data while also seeking to retain most studies for moderator analyses. This approach of generally including all of the available evidence in a meta-analysis is widely supported in contemporary sources (see H. Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009 ). We applied the outlier labeling rule proposed by Tukey (1977) and further developed by Hoaglin and Iglewicz (1987 , who reported only Garcia (1993) as an outlier. Removing any one of these outliers did not result in an appreciable impact on the overall effect (ds with respective study removed ϭ 0.163, 0.146, 0.152, and 0.144). The study characteristics for each outlier were examined, with no clearly identified pattern. L. Lambert and Wertheimer (1988) produced one of the largest effects in Spengler et al., and was also one of few studies to assess "no" to "some" experience. Given our interest in providing a comprehensive assessment of the experience judgment accuracy literature, we chose to retain outliers but also to report their impact. Garcia produced such an extreme outlier effect (d ϭ 3.08), however, that it was removed from moderator analyses. With Garcia removed, the overall random effects, d ϭ .146 (95% CI [.08, .21]), and the variance, Q (112) ϭ 180.759, p ϭ .000, remained heterogeneous. We consider these data to represent the overall experience-accuracy effect.
Sensitivity Analyses
To assess the robustness of the experience-accuracy effect, we conducted various steps subsumed under the concept of sensitivity analysis (Greenhouse & Iyengar, 2009) . We examined the impact on the findings of including or excluding outlier effects, of including or excluding the studies with zero effects, and differences as a result of FE versus random-effects analyses. Zero effect sizes were calculated for seven studies when authors stated that the relation between experience and judgment accuracy was statistically nonsignificant and we failed to obtain their data (Blashfield, Sprock, Pinkston, & Hodgin, 1985; Chandler, 1970; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Hickling, Blanchard, Mundy, & Galovski, 2002; Leon & Perez, 2001; Slavney & Chase, 1985; E. Walker & Lewine, 1990) . A summary of these findings in Table 3 reveals little difference in the overall effect size or heterogeneity of variance, suggesting the overall effect is robust to analysis decisions. Table 4 displays the results of the mixed-effects moderator analyses conducted on all studies but excluding Garcia (1993) . Two classes of moderators were assessed: (a) conceptual or theoretically derived, and (b) methodological. These study moderators (i.e., independent variables hypothesized to influence the overall effect size) were analyzed using Hedges and Olkin's (1985) counterpart to the analysis of variance. For categorical moderators with multiple levels (e.g., analogue, archival, and in vivo), the betweenclass effect is reported (Q B ) in addition to the 95% CI. We used subgroup analyses or a shifting unit of analysis, as identified by H. Cooper (1998) , for the planned comparisons of extreme experience ("no" to "some" experience and nonexperts vs. experts). Categorical moderators were analyzed when there were at least three studies in a category level. For the continuous variable of time, we used two strategies: (a) mixed-effects metaregression with year as the predictor, and (b) cumulative meta-analysis by year.
Moderator Analyses
Conceptual moderators. The following moderators are discussed in the literature as having potential relevance to the experience-accuracy effect. To extend , we included (a) the impact of decision making based on psychological tests, and (b, c) subgroup analyses of extremes of experience ("no" to "some" experience and nonexperts vs. experts).
Experience type. The type of experience could be coded as clinical, educational, or both. None of these types of experience Note. CI ϭ confidence interval. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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had a moderating effect on judgment accuracy, Q B (2) ϭ 1.63, p ϭ .44. This finding, along with the small overall random effects d ϭ .146, supports the robustness of earlier finding that experience, whether clinical or educational, has only a marginal impact on improving clinical judgment decision making. Experience specificity. Specificity of experience was coded as general, specific, or both. It seems reasonable to assume, based on behavior decision-making theory (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) , that specific experience would be a moderator because unique decision-making skills may be honed over time, but this was not supported, Q B (2) ϭ 1.16, p ϭ .56. An alternative explanation is that experts, compared with novices, may simply become more confident, but not necessarily more accurate, in a specific area of expertise (Goldberg, 1959) .
Judgment outcome. Type of judgment made was categorized as problem type (diagnosis), hit rate (usually repeated judgments of diagnosis or prognosis), treatment decisions, severity, prognosis, problem recall, other, or combined and was found to be a significant moderator, Q B (6) ϭ 13.42, p ϭ .04. More experienced clinicians were better at assessing clients' problems (d iϩ ϭ .22) and were more accurate in studies employing a combination of judgments (d iϩ ϭ .21). These results match , in which more experienced clinicians were found to perform better on diagnostic or problem judgment tasks. Spengler et al. also found experience to be associated with more accurate treatment recommendations (consistent with practice guidelines) and improved accuracy on other judgments.
Criterion validity. Criterion validity could be categorized as low, high, or both based upon the objective standard for judgment accuracy. Our assumption was that when the criterion is more valid, it would be easier to predict, and therefore there would be greater differences when the criterion was "fuzzy"; however, unlike , criterion validity did not have a significant moderating effect, Q B (2) ϭ 2.31, p ϭ .316.
Tests used by judges. Because interpretation of tests is part of training and clinical experience, and requires specialized skills for accurate interpretation, we assumed that more experienced clinicians would fare better in their decision making with tests, and especially with more objective compared with projective test protocols, but we found no differences, Q B (4) ϭ 5.22, p ϭ .27.
Provision of feedback. Provision of feedback was coded dichotomously as "yes" or "no," according to whether or not feedback was provided to participants at some point in their decision making, and accuracy was measured before and after the provision of feedback. Contrary to models of learning and expertness in other fields (e.g., chess, elite athletes; Ericsson et al., 1993), feedback did not reveal a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, Q B (1) ϭ .03, p ϭ .868. However, only five studies using feedback were identified.
Inclusion of no experience participants. To assess a broader range of experience from none to more, non-mental-health participants (e.g., undergraduates or other non-mental-health professionals) were contrasted with mental health clinicians. Contrary to assertion that there may be the greatest gain in judgment accuracy from no experience to some or more, this subgroup comparison of non-mental-health participants did not reveal a statistically significant moderating effect, Q B (1) ϭ 2.26, p ϭ .13.
Experts versus nonexperts. According to Ericsson and colleagues' (1993) theory of expertise, we anticipated that experts would show better judgment accuracy compared with nonexperts, but this was not the case, Q B (1) ϭ 0.95, p ϭ .33.
Publication source. Publication source was coded as APA, other psychology journal, psychiatric or medical journal, or dissertation and had a significant impact on the experience-accuracy effect, Q B (3) ϭ 14.12, p ϭ .003. Similar to , studies published in APA journals reported the largest effects (d iϩ ϭ .33). Nonetheless, the 95% CI for APA journals crosses with dissertations (d iϩ ϭ .15) and psychiatric or medical journals (d iϩ ϭ .27), indicating a lack of true difference between these outlets. What these findings show is that smaller experience-accuracy effects are published in non-APA mental health journals.
Methodological moderators. In addition to issues previously considered, Greenhouse and Iyengar (2009) suggest that the impact of various methodological variables, including study quality, be considered in a sensitivity analysis strategy. If the study quality is a significant moderator, then it may be relevant, for example, to focus the review on higher quality experience-accuracy research. We also examined other methodological issues related to the ecological validity of the studies and whether or not experience was a primary focus by researchers.
Study quality. A primary question in a sensitivity analysis is do lower quality studies show greater variability or systematic bias? Study quality was categorized as acceptable, good, or excellent. The global rating of methods and analyses involved use of Shadish, Cook, and Campbell's (2002) threats to validity. Decisions about study quality included the study's design, execution, and analyses. Study quality was not shown to make a significant impact on the relation between experience and judgment accuracy, Q B (2) ϭ 3.30, p ϭ .19.
Method of study. Clinical judgment research has been criticized for lacking ecological validity or as being artificial, based on analogues of real judgment processes (Rock, Bransford, Maisto, & Morey, 1987) . We categorized methods as analogue, archival, or in vivo, referring to the way materials were presented to participants. In some studies, participants were presented with case studies of fictitious clients (e.g., Brammer, 2002) , whereas in others, confederates or real clients were used (e.g., Hickling et al., 2002) . Whether or not the judgment task had higher ecological validity was not a significant moderator, Q B (2) ϭ 1.59, p ϭ .45.
Ecology of stimulus presentation. Ecological validity was further assessed by whether or not participants directly experienced the clinical material by videotape, role-play, or live presentation (Rock et al., 1987) . By contrast, participants could experience the material indirectly, for example, through written case studies or test protocols. This form of ecological validity also did not moderate the experienceaccuracy effect, Q B (1) ϭ .20, p ϭ .90.
Relation of experience to the research design. One of the reasons experience may not be associated with judgment accuracy may be that it has not been treated as a major focus by researchers in their designs. If this were the case, supplementary analyses may capitalize upon spurious findings based on exploratory analyses. Experience was categorized as not in the design, in the research design, in supplementary analyses, or assessed by multiple means, and was not a significant moderator, Q B (3) ϭ 5.21, p ϭ .16.
Experience as a major variable. Another way to examine researchers' focus on the experience-accuracy effect was whether or not it was in the introduction as a major variable of importance reflected by a priori hypotheses. Whether or not experience was This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
conceptualized in this manner as a major variable was not a significant moderator, Q B (1) ϭ .04, p ϭ .85.
Publication Year
The results of a mixed-effects metaregression with year of publication as the predictor demonstrated no statistically significant changes in 40 years of research on the experience-accuracy effect, z ϭ .73, p ϭ .467. A scatterplot of these data visually demonstrates the relative stability of the experience-accuracy effect over time (see Figure 1) . To further assess the impact of time, we conducted a cumulative random effects meta-analysis (Borenstein et al., 2009 ) by year of publication.
2 A cumulative metaanalysis is actually a series of meta-analyses in which the overall results are adjusted with the addition of each new study, thereby demonstrating conclusions that could be reached at any point in time. Ioannidis and Trikalinos (2005) demonstrated that earlier studies usually overestimate population effects, whereas studies with smaller effect sizes take longer to get published. Instead, we found that early experience-accuracy studies had many negative and small effect sizes. It was not until Morran (1986) 
Publication Bias
Assessing for publication bias is another key aspect to a sensitivity analysis strategy. It is well known that editors and reviewers are more interested in publishing statistically significant than statistically nonsignificant findings (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005) . A "fail-safe" analysis was conducted to address the problem of publication bias (Rosenthal, 1991) . According to Rosenthal, "journals are filled with the 5% of the studies that show Type I errors, while the file drawers back at the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show nonsignificant (e.g., p Ͼ .05) results" (p.
638). The two-tailed z value for the observed studies is 5.62, p Ͻ .00001. To obtain a statistically nonsignificant z value under the cutoff of 1.96 would require the addition of 818 studies with zero effects, which seems unlikely. Criticisms have been levied against use of a fail-safe analysis (Becker, 2005) because of a biased assumption that missing studies have a zero effect and no consideration of weights for missing sample sizes. A recommended alternative is the funnel plot, which allows for visual examination of the experience-accuracy effect sizes on the horizontal axis plotted against a measure of study sample sizes, in this case, precision (1/standard error), on the vertical axis (see Figure 2) . Larger studies cluster toward the top of the graph toward the mean effect size, whereas smaller studies appear toward the bottom of the graph. Asymmetry at the bottom of a funnel plot is typically related to omission of small sample sizes with statistically nonsignificant effects, and may be a sign of publication bias, which is not evident in the funnel. Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, and Minder (1997) suggest a statistical assessment by using the inverse of the standard error (precision) to predict the experience-accuracy d effect, which results in a two-tailed t ϭ 0.40 (111), p ϭ .69. These findings comprehensively rule out publication bias.
Discussion
Given these results, the most parsimonious modeling of 40 years of experience-accuracy clinical judgment research is the overall weighted experience-accuracy random effects d ϭ .146. Although small by any convention, the experience-accuracy effect is robust, as it stands up to scrutiny in a sensitivity analysis and is stable over time. There is relative consistency in the size despite inclusion or exclusion of zero effects or outlier study effects, or analysis using random-effects or FE models. We also found remarkable consistency in the size and variance of this effect since 1999, suggesting little improvement in decision-making accuracy by mental health professionals despite possible changes in training and practice environments. Because of findings from Schmidt et al. (2009) that FE analyses may overestimate effect sizes, we used a randomeffects model with little change in the size or the 95% CI compared with . We found no evidence of publication bias suggesting that both small or large and negative or positive 2 Results of the cumulative meta-analysis are available upon request. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
experience-accuracy effects have been equally published in the literature and dissertations. In short, the results of this extension and meta-reanalysis of the experience-accuracy effect strongly suggest that there is only slight improvement in decision-making accuracy with increasing experience, be it educational or clinical. For counseling and other psychologists who take their education and training seriously, this level of improvement may be disheartening and should, as Ridley and Shaw-Ridley (2009) commented, prompt the field to move "with urgency" to improve training models (p. 400). These findings suggest either that there are real problems with training and clinical growth in mental health professionals, and/or that the data from these clinical judgment studies are limited in capturing the relation between experience and accuracy. We begin by speculating about the first point. The results from the present meta-analysis establish that experience leads to some, but not much, improvement in clinical decision making-at least as currently and historically trained, practiced, and researched. We agree with that "the question no longer is 'Does experience matter' but 'What changes are needed to enhance its impact on clinical decision making?'" (p. 420). A recent thought piece in the American Psychologist by Tracey, Wampold, Lichtenberg, and Goodyear (2014) details inherent problems in developing expertise as a psychotherapist or counselor. What defines expertise as a psychotherapist, beyond the capacity for providing optimal relationship skills, may be fuzzy and ill defined. Experience has been studied in relation to the developmental trajectory of expertness in chess masters, elite athletes, virtuoso musicians, and lifetime achievement scientists, for which there are arguably clearer benchmarks for optimal performance (Ericsson et al., 1993) . The benefit of experience has been more elusive and uncertain in the domain of mental health clinical decision making. This does not have to be the case, however, as there are a subset of objective benchmarks reflecting what constitutes accurate classification and prediction of human behavior (Spengler, 2013) . Therefore, we argue that assessment and clinical decision-making activities may afford a different learning environment than does psychotherapy. Rønnestad and Skovholt (2013) conducted an international longitudinal study of expertise in psychotherapy and concluded, "There must be a feedback loop so that the individual can learn from . . . practice" (p. 241). Others have inferred from years of research that to become an expert requires a minimum of 10 years of deliberate practice. Ericsson et al. (1993) define deliberate practice as consisting of three components rarely provided in counseling psychology graduate training or in practice settings: (a) a well-defined task with a developmentally appropriate difficulty level for skill acquisition, (b) informative feedback, and (c) the opportunity for repetition and correction of error. By contrast, hours are spent in counseling psychology training programs dedicated to the practice of professional activities (e.g., counseling, assessment) without clear standards. Ericsson et al. noted, "The view that merely engaging in a sufficient amount of practice, regardless of the structure of that practice, leads to maximal performance has a long and contested history" (p. 365).
One of the reasons for no change over time in the small experience-accuracy effect may be that training programs for counseling and other psychologists do not meet this three-pronged definition, found to be necessary in other domains (music, chess, athletics, science), for optimal learning and mastery of complex activities such as psychotherapy or assessment. Rather than practicing an activity, such as assessment, even with supervision, the pathway to becoming an expert might require much more careful and intentional performance scrutiny based upon a model that establishes optimal performance. In the realm of prediction of behavior, such as dangerousness to self or others, parental fitness, academic performance, or response to bariatric surgery, feedback about accuracy may be the exception rather than the norm, such that conditions for deliberate practice oftentimes are not met. Nonetheless, these conditions do exist for optimal training and practice if counseling and other psychologists would routinely collect data on their performance (e.g., see patient progress feedback; Shimokawa, Lambert, & Smart, 2010) .
Beyond the global finding of a small gain in decision making with more experience, and a lack of change in the experienceaccuracy effect size over time, what else do these data have to say about experience? It may be what they don't have to say that is most significant. We more than doubled the participant pool over meta-analysis from 4,607 to 11,584 participants with a potential increase in statistical power to detect moderation (cf. Cohn & Becker, 2003) . Spengler et al. found the same statistically significant moderators (judgment type, publication source), plus the addition of moderation by criterion validity, reflecting no additional success by researchers in identifying moderators of the experience-accuracy effect. We expected practitioners with specific experience related to the judgment task to show the greatest gains. That this was not the case is one of the strongest arguments against there being any experience effect. We were interested in assessing the hypothesis that the small experienceaccuracy effect is an artifact of restricted range of experience (cf. L. Lambert & Wertheimer, 1988 ; M. J. Lambert & Ogles, 2004) . In Spengler et al., the lowest level of experience was restricted to a graduate student. The present study, by contrast, included comparisons with undergraduates, teachers, administrative assistants, laypersons, and nonmental health professionals to capture a lower end of experience, yet we found no difference between the "no" experience to "some" experience groups. We also assumed that experts could make better judgments but this was not the case. The construct of expert, however, in our opinion was confounded by proxy variables such as time in the field. Some researchers, for example, simply labeled more experienced clinicians as the "experts" (e.g., Kim & Ahn, 2002) . Without performance markers, this makes identifying true experts near impossible. We accepted researcher definitions for "experts," but conclude this is an area that remains open for further study. We urge researchers to establish expertise based on performance standards and not conflate with experience.
With the glaring challenge these results pose to graduate training programs and practicing clinicians, they also raise important questions about how learning about clinical decision making occurs. Skill acquisition for clinical decisions may not follow a slope such as modeled in a traditional learning curve. These data do not allow for other types of analyses, but researchers might consider examining growth curves or other nonlinear models for changes in decision making over time. Witteman and van den Bercken (2007) note that there may be a U-or an S-shaped pattern to skill acquisition as opposed to a linear progression. They proposed that This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
there may be a drop in performance at the intermediate level of experience because intermediate-level decision makers have a great deal of knowledge, but it is poorly organized and they may perform unnecessary cognitive operations compared with novices. Nonetheless, based on the present findings, we strongly urge graduate counseling and psychology programs to seriously reconsider their approach to training clinical assessment, judgment, and decision making. Despite clear theoretical models and decades of impressive empirical findings on the benefits of deliberate practice from other fields (Ericsson et al., 1993) , and well-documented problems inherent in unassisted mental health clinical judgments (Spengler, 2013) , graduate programs have ignored this obvious need for decision-making training (Harding, 2007) . Until proven otherwise, we also strongly urge counseling and other psychologists to not rely solely upon their experience or expertness as the basis for the accuracy of their decisions (cf. Faust & Faust, 2012) . One of the biggest threats to a meta-analysis is the quality of the research studies or the so called "garbage in-garbage out" critique (Eysenck, 1978) . We addressed this issue and found no impact of study quality or other methodological moderators. Table 4 reveals several frequencies of study characteristics that further address the quality of these 114 studies. We found the majority of studies as being of good or excellent research quality (n ϭ 83). Most of these studies also placed experience squarely in the primary experimental design (n ϭ 86) and conceptualized experience as a major theoretical variable (n ϭ 100). Therefore, we ruled out poor quality or capitalizing upon spurious findings, which would be suggested by a predominance of secondary or supplemental analyses, as threats to this research. The major threat we observe, however, is an overreliance on analogue (n ϭ 96) and less ecologically valid presentations of judgment stimuli (n ϭ 83), suggesting older complaints by Holt (1958) remain valid that clinical judgment research is not ecologically valid for the clinician. Only 10 studies examined archival records of decision making, and a mere seven used in vivo techniques. This has to be our principal criticism of this body of clinical judgment literature-that it is largely laboratory-based research. This mono-method bias is, in our opinion, the most significant threat to the validity of this body of research, and warrants serious consideration by future researchers.
It is of no surprise that scholars have concluded that experience is not associated with improvements in accuracy, given the number of studies (103 of 114) with 95% CIs crossing zero (see Table 1 ). The results of this experience-accuracy clinical judgment metaanalysis raise significant questions regarding the benefits of education, the time invested, and clinical experience for counseling and other psychologists. These findings raise questions for researchers in terms of whether the benefits of experience have been appropriately measured and tested in these clinical judgment studies. Counseling psychology as a field promotes effective models of training and should take seriously the evidence pointing to the limited benefits of training and experience on improving clinical decision making. The field of counseling psychology is well positioned for a leadership role in research on clinical judgment. For example, the same methods that are used for studying psychotherapy process and outcome are transferrable to the study of clinical decision making for in vivo research. The lack of evidence for the benefits of experience from this comprehensive meta-analysis should not discourage, but should encourage researchers toward future investigation of ways to improve the impact of experience on judgment accuracy. A small improvement with experience may not be trivial when accuracy is paramount, such as in socially sensitive decisions about suicide, custody, and surgery; nonetheless, the identified gain is trivial when considering the low return from years of education, time, effort, and expense. Our hope is that these results will prompt the field to develop better methods for studying, training, and educating counseling and other psychologists to improve their decision making.
